After Ukraine, Taiwan?
Within a few days, Trump’s chaotic team has rehabilitated Putin, betrayed Ukraine and plunged Europe into an acute security crisis. Is history repeating itself in Asia, where Trump could strike a deal with China, abandon Taiwan and snub his previous allies? The wild card remains India.
The geopolitical situation of existing alliances is even more complex in the Asia-Pacific than in Europe. At the moment, there is little to suggest that the rivalry between the established superpower USA, and the rising superpower China, could ease. Quite the opposite.
USA vs. China
The economic war against China, which had already begun during Trump 1.0 and was continued by President Biden, is now continuing seamlessly under Trump 2.0. Currently, there is an arbitrary border tax on all imports from China, which Beijing has responded to with moderate counter-tariffs so far. And also with some restrictions in the export of rare earths urgently need by the American tech industry. More serious is the American obstruction of online trade, such as shipments from the ‘small parcel giants’ Temu and Shein to individual American customers, where the previous exemption from customs duties will be completely abolished.
The security policy confrontation is intensifying, particularly due to the excessive armament of the Chinese navy and coast guard, which, far beyond its nominal function, is developing amphibious means to land on enemy islands. The USA has responded to this, relatively unnoticed, by stationing medium-range missiles at its bases in the Philippines. More are to follow at the US bases in Japan, although this has not yet been officially approved by Tokyo.
Hostile island should be read as a reference to Taiwan. Almost unconditionally supported by Biden, Trump began his second term in office with a sharp scolding of Taipei: ‘Taiwan took our chip business away’. Is this the usual first and excessive demand of the rug trader in the White House to demand more money, or is it a sign that ‘peace general’ Trump does not want to risk a potentially serious conflict with China over Taiwan? Beijing will in any case watch closely how ruthlessly and unnecessarily Ukraine has been sacrificed to Trump’s desire for global understanding among autocrats. Contrary to the opinion of experts, which was still valid until recently, an escalation of Chinese aggression against Taiwan cannot be ruled out in the near future. Initially, to test the corresponding pain threshold, or to see if it even exists in Trump’s White House. This is despite the much-cited China Hawks in the government and parliament in Washington. Trump has already shown with his abrupt turn in the Ukraine war how his own hawks become tame doves under his command.
The main losers
Japan, South Korea and Australia must already be considered the main losers from Donald Trump’s move into the White House and his first few weeks in office. In the best case, they suffer from the uncertainty of whether Trump will continue to regard them as close allies and indispensable pillars of the existing Pax Americana in the Indo-Pacific. Labeled freeloaders by the White House they could get away with ransom payments and other economic concessions. Japan and Korea would have to pay a much higher price than in the past for the stationing of American forces on their soil, as would Australia for the planned acquisition of American technology for nuclear-powered submarines.
Even such a for Trump comparatively mild approach defies all strategic reason. The hitherto successful American policy of building a staggered defense against Chinese encroachment in East Asia and the Pacific appears to be in Washington’s own interest. However, as is constantly being demonstrated, strategic foresight and the pursuit of your own long-term interests are not qualities in demand in the current White House.
A kind of ‘super deal’ between Trump and Xi Jinping would be quite simply disastrous for the US’s traditional allies in the region. As Xi has little to fear in his autocratic empire, he would probably accept severe economic losses for his country if he received more leeway from Trump in return, in China’s quest to be the undisputed leader in the greater region. Seoul in particular, but also Tokyo and Canberra, would have to completely abandon their previous defense doctrine based on backstopping by Washington
In the middle, ASEAN
The defense minister of Singapore, where the US has a de facto military base thanks to the appropriate infrastructure, recently described the situation succinctly: the US has changed from liberator to disruptor to landlord seeking rent.
He is assuming, as mentioned under the first scenario, that the ASEAN states can buy the continued existence of the American security umbrella. The small and agile city-state would probably have less to fear in the context of a Big Deal between Trump and Xi than e.g. the Philippines who are already under strong Chinese pressure to give up sovereignty claims. Whether a Big Deal would mean that Southeast Asia would be divided into spheres of influence is open to question. Despite all the major economic, historical and ethnic differences within ASEAN, the organization has so far shown remarkable coherence. Although Laos and Cambodia are already to some extent Chinese vassal states and the failed state Myanmar can offer little resistance to China, this is certainly not the case for Vietnam, the heavyweight among the Indochinese ASEAN states. Regarding the six original ASEAN countries, the same applies certainly to Indonesia, which is large and wealthy enough to remain non-aligned.
Wild card India
This applies to an even greater extent to India, where predictions about geopolitical changes resulting from Trump’s unpredictability are particularly difficult. Prime Minister Modi has welcomed Trump’s election, partly because he sees in him an autocratic soulmate who remains untroubled by moral scruples, and also because India benefits from the currently dominant rivalry between Washington and Beijing as a heavyweight of non-Chinese Asia.
Whether this will last is uncertain. For the time being, India is playing the card of strategic all-round independence. Modi has already spoken to Trump promising economic concessions and arms purchases to his obsessively transactional counterpart in the White House. Sophisticated armament is particularly important for Delhi, which has traditionally sought to protect itself against its large neighbor China with Soviet and then Russian arms. This appears uncertain in the future looking at the already overburdened industry in a Russia, bled white by Putin’s aggression in Europe. With its massive purchases of raw materials, especially boycotted oil from Russia and its simultaneous wooing of Chinese capital to accelerate its industrialization, Delhi is trying to maintain equidistance from the USA, China and Russia.
It is uncertain whether Modi will thus achieve his immodest goal of making India a major Asian, non-aligned power and the leader of the Global South. This will also depend on whether Trump views Delhi as a counterweight to China or whether he no longer considers this necessary in the context of the aforementioned arrangement with China for the Indo-Pacific.
Photo by Malcolm Choong 鍾声耀 on Unsplash