Recent developments in and around Iran

Iran remains a topic in moves of world powers and others: a) the USA may follow increasingly Trump’s inclinations against Iran; b) France has unsuccessfully tried to mediate between Iran’s claims to a sovereign missile defence and the US’ tentative rejection of the Nuclear Agreement; c) Switzerland has upgraded its trade relations with Iran. The USA may, thus, experience some loss of its status as “the indispensable nation” for keeping some degree of international control over regional conflicts; France may recognize that a profitable relation as a trading partner puts limits on the aspirations to act as a world power in Middle East matters; Switzerland, not strategically relevant, may profit as a friendly partner of Iran.

End of last February, Iran’s Government hosted the first Joint Economic Commission with its bilateral trading partner Switzerland and declared to be very satisfied with the results. Direct association with the February meeting in Tehran gave Share-an-Ambassador a useful insight into the inter-governmental exchange about the wide range of common interests in the economic field. Of course, international political challenges and limitations to a sound development of economic relations with Iran apply also to Switzerland, but there is a clear Iranian interest in Swiss technology needed for the reform of their industry and infrastructure and a clear Swiss capacity and willingness to respond to the needs. Both sides consider the event of the Commission as an up-grading of the relationship.

France, equally interested in maintaining and developing its status as one of Iran’s major suppliers in technological and industrial fields, belongs to the six world powers bound by the obligations of the “Nuclear Deal” concluded with Iran in July 2015 and being implemented since January 2016. As Party to the Agreement, France has got to define its position between impeccable loyalty to the spirit and the letter of the Agreement and the position of one other “Western” signatory, the USA, who, through the voice of its current President, tends to see their obligations under the treaty as unfavourable for their own security (Trump: “worst deal ever”). French president Macron was in Tehran, last week, and tried to address the question of Iran’s ballistic missile program. The Iranian Government’s refusal to consider any discussion about the legitimacy of their military program was immediate and absolute. For Iran, the ballistic missile program is part of Iran’s defence endeavours and completely outside the scope of the Nuclear Agreement. The French president’s attempt to somehow address US concerns may have been made in order to save the Nuclear Agreement by reconciling the hostile US position and the interests of the other signatories to the Agreement, who insist that the “Deal” is to the benefit of all parties. The French will have to choose between the role of an (unsolicited) mediator and the defence of national economic interests in trading with Iran. They will probably choose the latter.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump replaced his Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, with CIA Director Mike Pompeo. Style and decency of the handling of this personnel issue, or rather the lack of it, are not the topic of these lines. But under the aspect of the United States’ international standing and the effectiveness and the sustainability of its strategies and policies it is relevant to bear in mind that this last illustration of the President’s character will be long remembered by all his staff, in diplomacy and in domestic affairs. Similarly, the absence of trustworthiness and loyalty in personal relations has had its equivalence in intergovernmental relations globally. In the field of relationships, America’s hallmark is now its unreliability and unpredictability. That puts a strain on relations with friends and allies, but equally on possible and actual adversaries. For regions and times of crises, like the Middle East today, this reputation turns into a major impediment, for the USA, regarding its ability to impose on others its strategic or political choices.

Former Secretary of State Tillerson may have acquired among State Department staff the qualification of “the worst in living memory”, but on important international topics like climate change, approach to nuclear North Korea, loyal implementation of the “Nuclear Deal” of six world powers with Iran, Tillerson had opposed the President’s changing instincts in favour of positions agreed with partners and allies, and had made his opposition visible, although in a decent and loyal manner. His successor, Mike Pompeo, a CIA director installed by Trump, is said to be much closer to Trump’s basic instincts of rejecting internationally shared approaches to the big international questions. With regard to Iran, it will probably prove relevant that Pompeo once served as an army officer in Iraq before turning to politics in the USA and then to high government responsibilities. One can assume that, from his personal Iraq experience, Pompeo has kept a one-dimensional military view on Iran, and one can expect that he will adopt and enhance the President’s announced rejection of the “Nuclear Deal” believing that changing the terms of the agreement with more burdens and limitations on Iran’s sovereign rights would be feasible. The idea will probably be to push Iran back into some isolation from which the country had been relieved by the Nuclear Agreement and the subsequent lifting of sanctions.

The purpose of the Agreement was meant to be in the interest of the signing parties, as long as the prospects for Iran to reintegrate global economy are kept alive. America’s European allies Britain, France and Germany, signatories of the Agreement, have all interest to see Iran joining the international community and to profit from Iran’s economic and political potential. Russia and China, equally signatories to the Agreement, have already found their exclusive economic and political interests in staying loyal to their relationship with Iran. Furthermore, they will, as a matter of principle, oppose any tentative move of the USA in the UN Security Council to turn back the historic political evolution of the Iran case. The USA may still be the strongest military power and the largest economy globally, but in the Middle East region it is being identified as the exclusive ally and defender of the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia, which is alienating a growing number of governments in the region, and the Arab “street” anyway. In the case of Syria and the talks about Syria’s future the US are already excluded from the relevant fora, like the Astana talks or the Sotchi talks between Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Assad regime. These are trends of historic relevance, and the nomination of Pompeo as the new US foreign minister will enhance these trends and make the US less “indispensable” as a good faith moderator and broker of regional peace. In the perspective of business, a tendency might follow that the US will not be considered and admitted as privileged supplier of technology, goods and services, when it comes to the reconstruction of devastated Syria and Iraq. Other powers involved are positioning themselves more successfully for that “time after”. European powers such as France and Germany and other global traders, unsuspicious like Switzerland, are already successfully supplying technology, goods and services necessary for Iran’s modernisation.

Picture: FatemehH